Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations

[EN] We investigate whether the value impact of family control in Western European firms depends on country-level investor protection. To this aim, we account for ownership–value nonlinearities. Supporting that the risk of expropriation increases with high ownership concentration, we find an inverte...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Pindado García, Julio, Requejo Puerto, Ignacio, De la Torre, Chabela
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2014
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Salamanca (USAL)
Repositorio:GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca
OAI Identifier:oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/149740
Acesso em linha:http://hdl.handle.net/10366/149740
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Family firm
Expropriation
Value impact
Nonlinearity
Investor protection
5307.13 Teoría de la Inversión
5311 Organización y Dirección de Empresas
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network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporationsPindado García, JulioRequejo Puerto, IgnacioDe la Torre, ChabelaFamily firmExpropriationValue impactNonlinearityInvestor protection5307.13 Teoría de la Inversión5311 Organización y Dirección de Empresas[EN] We investigate whether the value impact of family control in Western European firms depends on country-level investor protection. To this aim, we account for ownership–value nonlinearities. Supporting that the risk of expropriation increases with high ownership concentration, we find an inverted U-shape relation between family control and firm value. Family firms incur a value discount when family equity holdings exceed approximately 50%. The nonlinear effect of family control is attributable to family firms from a strongly protective environment. When investor protection is weak, family control has a positive impact on firm value regardless of the ownership concentration levelElsevier202220222014info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://hdl.handle.net/10366/149740reponame:GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamancainstname:Universidad de Salamanca (USAL)InglésAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:gredos.usal.es:10366/1497402026-06-07T06:28:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations
title Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations
spellingShingle Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations
Pindado García, Julio
Family firm
Expropriation
Value impact
Nonlinearity
Investor protection
5307.13 Teoría de la Inversión
5311 Organización y Dirección de Empresas
title_short Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations
title_full Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations
title_fullStr Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations
title_full_unstemmed Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations
title_sort Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Pindado García, Julio
Requejo Puerto, Ignacio
De la Torre, Chabela
author Pindado García, Julio
author_facet Pindado García, Julio
Requejo Puerto, Ignacio
De la Torre, Chabela
author_role author
author2 Requejo Puerto, Ignacio
De la Torre, Chabela
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Family firm
Expropriation
Value impact
Nonlinearity
Investor protection
5307.13 Teoría de la Inversión
5311 Organización y Dirección de Empresas
topic Family firm
Expropriation
Value impact
Nonlinearity
Investor protection
5307.13 Teoría de la Inversión
5311 Organización y Dirección de Empresas
description [EN] We investigate whether the value impact of family control in Western European firms depends on country-level investor protection. To this aim, we account for ownership–value nonlinearities. Supporting that the risk of expropriation increases with high ownership concentration, we find an inverted U-shape relation between family control and firm value. Family firms incur a value discount when family equity holdings exceed approximately 50%. The nonlinear effect of family control is attributable to family firms from a strongly protective environment. When investor protection is weak, family control has a positive impact on firm value regardless of the ownership concentration level
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014
2022
2022
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10366/149740
url http://hdl.handle.net/10366/149740
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca
instname:Universidad de Salamanca (USAL)
instname_str Universidad de Salamanca (USAL)
reponame_str GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca
collection GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869413218198224896
score 15.301603

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