Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations
[EN] We investigate whether the value impact of family control in Western European firms depends on country-level investor protection. To this aim, we account for ownership–value nonlinearities. Supporting that the risk of expropriation increases with high ownership concentration, we find an inverte...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Salamanca (USAL) |
| Repositorio: | GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/149740 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10366/149740 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Family firm Expropriation Value impact Nonlinearity Investor protection 5307.13 Teoría de la Inversión 5311 Organización y Dirección de Empresas |
| Sumario: | [EN] We investigate whether the value impact of family control in Western European firms depends on country-level investor protection. To this aim, we account for ownership–value nonlinearities. Supporting that the risk of expropriation increases with high ownership concentration, we find an inverted U-shape relation between family control and firm value. Family firms incur a value discount when family equity holdings exceed approximately 50%. The nonlinear effect of family control is attributable to family firms from a strongly protective environment. When investor protection is weak, family control has a positive impact on firm value regardless of the ownership concentration level |
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