A Particularist Approach to Arguments by Analogy
In this article I defend what I call a ‘particularist approach to arguments by analogy.’ Particularism is opposed to generalism, which is the thesis that arguments by analogy require a universal principle that covers cases compared and guarantees the conclusion. Particularism rejects this claim and...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid |
| Repositorio: | Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/707494 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10486/707494 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10503-023-09616-7 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Arguments by analogy Meta-arguments Particularism and generalism Weighing of reasons Filosofía Literatura |
| Sumario: | In this article I defend what I call a ‘particularist approach to arguments by analogy.’ Particularism is opposed to generalism, which is the thesis that arguments by analogy require a universal principle that covers cases compared and guarantees the conclusion. Particularism rejects this claim and holds that arguments by analogy operate on particular cases. I elaborate on two ideas that support this position. On the one hand, I contend that an analogy can be seen as a parallelism of argumentative relationships, drawing on the distinction between similarity and analogy (Gentner 1983) and on the meta-argumentative account of arguments by analogy (Woods and Hudak 1989). On the other hand, I argue that universal principles are not necessary neither for the analysis nor the evaluation of arguments by analogy (Govier 1989) and that, rather than being a requirement, they can be seen as by-products of good analogies |
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