A case for a reason-based theory of argument submission date
A very basic intuition is that argumentation is about giving reasons. This is recognized, for example, when it is stated that the object of study of argumentation theory is argumentative practices that consist, in whole or in part, but, at least, to a significant extent, of asking for, giving, and e...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid |
| Repositorio: | Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/720566 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10486/720566 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10503-025-09658-z |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Conditions of rebuttal Inference Modifiers Reasons Theory of argument Weighing Filosofía |
| Sumario: | A very basic intuition is that argumentation is about giving reasons. This is recognized, for example, when it is stated that the object of study of argumentation theory is argumentative practices that consist, in whole or in part, but, at least, to a significant extent, of asking for, giving, and examining reasons. But this consensus does not translate into theory. In fact, reasons occupy a modest place in argumentation theory. Logical properties can be understood in terms of reasons or in terms of inferences, and in this sense, we can contrast reasons-based theories of argument with inference-based theories of argument. I will first show that the distinction between reasons-based and inference-based theories of argument is robust, and that there is a real difference between them. I will then argue that, as far as argumentation is concerned, a logical approach based on reasons is preferable to one based on inferences |
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