Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
This study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the number of...
| Autores: | , , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Data de publicação: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
| Repositório: | BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:burjcdigital.urjc.es:10115/113117 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/10115/113117 https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Accounting Business, finance Ciencias sociales Economia Economics and econometrics Finance Revistas de ciencias economicas y empresariales Agency costs Contestability Control-enhancing mechanisms Corporate governance Determinants Directors Family firms Firm performance Involvement Multiple large shareholders Ownership structure Shareholders' disproportionate board representation Shareholders’ disproportionate board representation Socioemotional wealth |
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Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?Sacristán Navarro, María AsunciónCabeza-Garcia, LGomez-Anson, SAccountingBusiness, financeCiencias socialesEconomiaEconomics and econometricsFinanceRevistas de ciencias economicas y empresarialesAgency costsContestabilityControl-enhancing mechanismsCorporate governanceDeterminantsDirectorsFamily firmsFirm performanceInvolvementMultiple large shareholdersOwnership structureShareholders'disproportionate board representationShareholders’ disproportionate board representationSocioemotional wealthThis study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the number of other large shareholders and their relative ownership over the family increase disproportionate family board power in the boardroom. Moreover, when the other large shareholders have more ownership than the family, disproportionate family board representation increases. The findings also highlight the significance of the other large shareholders' identity. Foreign investors reduce disproportionate family board power, while it does not appear to be affected by families and individuals or institutional investors. In sum, this research confirms the use of disproportionate board power by families as a control-enhancing mechanism to entrench family power on the board and protect their socioemotional wealth.Taylor & Francis202520242025info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/10115/113117https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329Sacristan-Navarro, M; Cabeza-Garcia, L; Gomez-Anson, S (2024). Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?. Spanish Journal Of Finance And Accounting-Revista Espanola De Financiacion Y Contabilida, 53(2), 203-231. DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329reponame:BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlosinstname:Universidad Rey Juan CarlosIngléshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329Spanish Journal Of Finance And Accounting-Revista Espanola De Financiacion Y Contabilida, 2024, 53, 2, 203-231Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:burjcdigital.urjc.es:10115/1131172026-06-24T12:48:17Z |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders? |
| title |
Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders? |
| spellingShingle |
Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders? Sacristán Navarro, María Asunción Accounting Business, finance Ciencias sociales Economia Economics and econometrics Finance Revistas de ciencias economicas y empresariales Agency costs Contestability Control-enhancing mechanisms Corporate governance Determinants Directors Family firms Firm performance Involvement Multiple large shareholders Ownership structure Shareholders' disproportionate board representation Shareholders’ disproportionate board representation Socioemotional wealth |
| title_short |
Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders? |
| title_full |
Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders? |
| title_fullStr |
Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders? |
| title_sort |
Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders? |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Sacristán Navarro, María Asunción Cabeza-Garcia, L Gomez-Anson, S |
| author |
Sacristán Navarro, María Asunción |
| author_facet |
Sacristán Navarro, María Asunción Cabeza-Garcia, L Gomez-Anson, S |
| author_role |
author |
| author2 |
Cabeza-Garcia, L Gomez-Anson, S |
| author2_role |
author author |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Accounting Business, finance Ciencias sociales Economia Economics and econometrics Finance Revistas de ciencias economicas y empresariales Agency costs Contestability Control-enhancing mechanisms Corporate governance Determinants Directors Family firms Firm performance Involvement Multiple large shareholders Ownership structure Shareholders' disproportionate board representation Shareholders’ disproportionate board representation Socioemotional wealth |
| topic |
Accounting Business, finance Ciencias sociales Economia Economics and econometrics Finance Revistas de ciencias economicas y empresariales Agency costs Contestability Control-enhancing mechanisms Corporate governance Determinants Directors Family firms Firm performance Involvement Multiple large shareholders Ownership structure Shareholders' disproportionate board representation Shareholders’ disproportionate board representation Socioemotional wealth |
| description |
This study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the number of other large shareholders and their relative ownership over the family increase disproportionate family board power in the boardroom. Moreover, when the other large shareholders have more ownership than the family, disproportionate family board representation increases. The findings also highlight the significance of the other large shareholders' identity. Foreign investors reduce disproportionate family board power, while it does not appear to be affected by families and individuals or institutional investors. In sum, this research confirms the use of disproportionate board power by families as a control-enhancing mechanism to entrench family power on the board and protect their socioemotional wealth. |
| publishDate |
2024 |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2024 2025 2025 |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| format |
article |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/10115/113117 https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329 |
| url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10115/113117 https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329 |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
Inglés |
| language_invalid_str_mv |
Inglés |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329 Spanish Journal Of Finance And Accounting-Revista Espanola De Financiacion Y Contabilida, 2024, 53, 2, 203-231 |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
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openAccess |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Taylor & Francis |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Taylor & Francis |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Sacristan-Navarro, M; Cabeza-Garcia, L; Gomez-Anson, S (2024). Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?. Spanish Journal Of Finance And Accounting-Revista Espanola De Financiacion Y Contabilida, 53(2), 203-231. DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329 reponame:BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos instname:Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
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Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
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BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
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BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
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1869412878137688064 |
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15,811543 |