On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit

We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904, Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213, Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041, Neme, Alejandro
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2008
País:España
Institución:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ddd.uab.cat:137879
Acceso en línea:https://ddd.uab.cat/record/137879
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Social choice
Equilibria of voting
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spelling On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exitBerga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041Neme, AlejandroSocial choiceEquilibria of votingWe consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that, under plausible restrictions on preferences, equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy stability and voter's sovereignty. 22008-01-0120082008-01-01Articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501VoRhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://ddd.uab.cat/record/137879reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UABinstname:Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaInglésengMinisterio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2007-60671Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2005-07637-C02-01Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2005-04081Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2005/SGR-00213Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2005/SGR-00454open accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ddd.uab.cat:1378792026-06-06T12:50:31Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
title On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
spellingShingle On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
Social choice
Equilibria of voting
title_short On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
title_full On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
title_fullStr On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
title_full_unstemmed On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
title_sort On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Neme, Alejandro
author Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
author_facet Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Neme, Alejandro
author_role author
author2 Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Neme, Alejandro
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Social choice
Equilibria of voting
topic Social choice
Equilibria of voting
description We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that, under plausible restrictions on preferences, equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy stability and voter's sovereignty.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2
2008-01-01
2008
2008-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
VoR
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://ddd.uab.cat/record/137879
url https://ddd.uab.cat/record/137879
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2007-60671
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2005-07637-C02-01
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2005-04081
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2005/SGR-00213
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2005/SGR-00454
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
instname:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
instname_str Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
collection Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
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