Making statements and approval voting

We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) s...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Aragonés, Enriqueta, Gilboa, Itzhak, Weiss, A.
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2010
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/44733
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/44733
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Approval voting
Turnout
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spelling Making statements and approval votingAragonés, EnriquetaGilboa, ItzhakWeiss, A.Approval votingTurnoutWe assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.Peer reviewedSpringer Nature201220122010info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://hdl.handle.net/10261/44733reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Ingléshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/447332026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Making statements and approval voting
title Making statements and approval voting
spellingShingle Making statements and approval voting
Aragonés, Enriqueta
Approval voting
Turnout
title_short Making statements and approval voting
title_full Making statements and approval voting
title_fullStr Making statements and approval voting
title_full_unstemmed Making statements and approval voting
title_sort Making statements and approval voting
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Aragonés, Enriqueta
Gilboa, Itzhak
Weiss, A.
author Aragonés, Enriqueta
author_facet Aragonés, Enriqueta
Gilboa, Itzhak
Weiss, A.
author_role author
author2 Gilboa, Itzhak
Weiss, A.
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Approval voting
Turnout
topic Approval voting
Turnout
description We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010
2012
2012
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/44733
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/44733
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Nature
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Nature
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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