Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398, Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ddd.uab.cat:220828
Acceso en línea:https://ddd.uab.cat/record/220828
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3982/TE2118
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Sequential voting
Agendas
Manipulation
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spelling Sequential voting and agenda manipulationBarberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296Sequential votingAgendasManipulationWe study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas allow us to compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the domain of preference profiles for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the simple majority quota nor any other quota uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation. 22017-01-0120172017-01-01Articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501VoRhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://ddd.uab.cat/record/220828https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3982/TE2118reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UABinstname:Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaInglésengMinisterio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 SEV-2011-0075Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 ECO2008-04756Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 ECO2014-53051-PAgència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2009/SGR-0419Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2014/SGR-515open accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ddd.uab.cat:2208282026-06-06T12:50:31Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
title Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
spellingShingle Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
Sequential voting
Agendas
Manipulation
title_short Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
title_full Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
title_fullStr Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
title_full_unstemmed Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
title_sort Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
author Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
author_facet Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
author_role author
author2 Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Sequential voting
Agendas
Manipulation
topic Sequential voting
Agendas
Manipulation
description We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas allow us to compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the domain of preference profiles for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the simple majority quota nor any other quota uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2
2017-01-01
2017
2017-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
VoR
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://ddd.uab.cat/record/220828
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3982/TE2118
url https://ddd.uab.cat/record/220828
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3982/TE2118
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 SEV-2011-0075
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004837 ECO2008-04756
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 ECO2014-53051-P
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2009/SGR-0419
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2014/SGR-515
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
instname:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
instname_str Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
collection Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
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