Platform acquisitions, product imitation and openness

Public authorities have shown concern about the possible harmful effects of platforms acquiring or imitating complementary services sold on their platforms. The effect of these practices on the restrictions on participation, development, or use of platform services (platform openness) has started to...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Sánchez Cartas, Juan Manuel
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:España
Institución:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
Repositorio:Docta Complutense
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/87340
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/87340
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:L41
L12
L13
L86
K21
Acquisitions
Mergers
Digital platforms
Openness
Economía
Economía industrial
5309.05 Monopolio y Competencia
5309.03 Regulación Gubernamental del Sector Privado
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oai_identifier_str oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/87340
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Platform acquisitions, product imitation and opennessSánchez Cartas, Juan ManuelL41L12L13L86K21AcquisitionsMergersDigital platformsOpennessEconomíaEconomía industrial5309.05 Monopolio y Competencia5309.03 Regulación Gubernamental del Sector PrivadoPublic authorities have shown concern about the possible harmful effects of platforms acquiring or imitating complementary services sold on their platforms. The effect of these practices on the restrictions on participation, development, or use of platform services (platform openness) has started to attract the attention of policymakers and researchers alike, but the evidence is still limited. We build a model that considers the trade-off that a monopoly platform faces when deciding whether to acquire or imitate a complementor and how such a decision influences openness and welfare. We show that a platform always has an incentive to acquire or imitate complementors. Which one is preferred depends on whether the increase in platform value (acquisition) offsets the market expansion effect (imitation). We find that acquisitions reduce openness and welfare but may generate more valuable complements while imitation increases openness and welfare but may harm third-party developers.SpringerUniversidad Complutense de Madrid20232023-07-2120232023-07-21journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501AMhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/87340reponame:Docta Complutenseinstname:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)Inglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/873402026-06-02T12:44:21Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Platform acquisitions, product imitation and openness
title Platform acquisitions, product imitation and openness
spellingShingle Platform acquisitions, product imitation and openness
Sánchez Cartas, Juan Manuel
L41
L12
L13
L86
K21
Acquisitions
Mergers
Digital platforms
Openness
Economía
Economía industrial
5309.05 Monopolio y Competencia
5309.03 Regulación Gubernamental del Sector Privado
title_short Platform acquisitions, product imitation and openness
title_full Platform acquisitions, product imitation and openness
title_fullStr Platform acquisitions, product imitation and openness
title_full_unstemmed Platform acquisitions, product imitation and openness
title_sort Platform acquisitions, product imitation and openness
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Sánchez Cartas, Juan Manuel
author Sánchez Cartas, Juan Manuel
author_facet Sánchez Cartas, Juan Manuel
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Complutense de Madrid
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv L41
L12
L13
L86
K21
Acquisitions
Mergers
Digital platforms
Openness
Economía
Economía industrial
5309.05 Monopolio y Competencia
5309.03 Regulación Gubernamental del Sector Privado
topic L41
L12
L13
L86
K21
Acquisitions
Mergers
Digital platforms
Openness
Economía
Economía industrial
5309.05 Monopolio y Competencia
5309.03 Regulación Gubernamental del Sector Privado
description Public authorities have shown concern about the possible harmful effects of platforms acquiring or imitating complementary services sold on their platforms. The effect of these practices on the restrictions on participation, development, or use of platform services (platform openness) has started to attract the attention of policymakers and researchers alike, but the evidence is still limited. We build a model that considers the trade-off that a monopoly platform faces when deciding whether to acquire or imitate a complementor and how such a decision influences openness and welfare. We show that a platform always has an incentive to acquire or imitate complementors. Which one is preferred depends on whether the increase in platform value (acquisition) offsets the market expansion effect (imitation). We find that acquisitions reduce openness and welfare but may generate more valuable complements while imitation increases openness and welfare but may harm third-party developers.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
2023-07-21
2023
2023-07-21
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
AM
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/87340
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/87340
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Docta Complutense
instname:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
instname_str Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
reponame_str Docta Complutense
collection Docta Complutense
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869410885307465728
score 15.301603

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