European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a closer examination of parties’ attitudes towards the Putin regime. While research has examined the connections of the EU's far-right with Russia, less attention has been given to the stances of Radical Left Parties (RLPs). We close this ga...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Holesch, Adam, 1977-, Zagórski, Priotr, Ramiro, Luis
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10230/69909
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10230/69909
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2024.2350245
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Russia
European Union
Radical left parties
2022 invasion of Ukraine
Foreign policy
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spelling European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards RussiaHolesch, Adam, 1977-Zagórski, PriotrRamiro, LuisRussiaEuropean UnionRadical left parties2022 invasion of UkraineForeign policyThe 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a closer examination of parties’ attitudes towards the Putin regime. While research has examined the connections of the EU's far-right with Russia, less attention has been given to the stances of Radical Left Parties (RLPs). We close this gap by analysing Roll Call Votes (RCVs) in the European Parliament. Our findings indicate that RLPs displayed the lowest levels of assertiveness towards Russia before 2022, being even less assertive than other Eurosceptic groups. RLPs significantly increased their assertiveness after the invasion, bringing them closer to the EP mainstream. However, some divergence in assertiveness towards Russia existed within the RLPs before 2022 and remains relevant after the invasion, with the Traditional/Communist parties standing closer to Russia than radical New Left/Democratic Socialist parties.This work was supported by the European Commission's Horizon Europe Programme for Research and Innovation, under the Grant Agreement number 101132483 (Project: BridgeGap).Taylor & Francis202520252024info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/69909http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2024.2350245reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésPolitical Research Exchange : an ECPR Journal. 2024;6(1):2350245info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/HE/101132483© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:10230/699092026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia
title European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia
spellingShingle European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia
Holesch, Adam, 1977-
Russia
European Union
Radical left parties
2022 invasion of Ukraine
Foreign policy
title_short European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia
title_full European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia
title_fullStr European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia
title_full_unstemmed European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia
title_sort European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Holesch, Adam, 1977-
Zagórski, Priotr
Ramiro, Luis
author Holesch, Adam, 1977-
author_facet Holesch, Adam, 1977-
Zagórski, Priotr
Ramiro, Luis
author_role author
author2 Zagórski, Priotr
Ramiro, Luis
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Russia
European Union
Radical left parties
2022 invasion of Ukraine
Foreign policy
topic Russia
European Union
Radical left parties
2022 invasion of Ukraine
Foreign policy
description The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a closer examination of parties’ attitudes towards the Putin regime. While research has examined the connections of the EU's far-right with Russia, less attention has been given to the stances of Radical Left Parties (RLPs). We close this gap by analysing Roll Call Votes (RCVs) in the European Parliament. Our findings indicate that RLPs displayed the lowest levels of assertiveness towards Russia before 2022, being even less assertive than other Eurosceptic groups. RLPs significantly increased their assertiveness after the invasion, bringing them closer to the EP mainstream. However, some divergence in assertiveness towards Russia existed within the RLPs before 2022 and remains relevant after the invasion, with the Traditional/Communist parties standing closer to Russia than radical New Left/Democratic Socialist parties.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
2025
2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10230/69909
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2024.2350245
url http://hdl.handle.net/10230/69909
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2024.2350245
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Political Research Exchange : an ECPR Journal. 2024;6(1):2350245
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/HE/101132483
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor & Francis
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor & Francis
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
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