La profondeur des dispositifs civilisateurs : la dialectique négative entre la politesse et la moralité chez l’anthropologie de Kant

[EN] This paper tackles the contribution that the beautiful appearance of virtue, whose multiplicity of forms can be gathered under the generic name of decorum, offers to the civilizing process and also to the progressive moralization of mankind according to Kant’s Moral Anthropology. First, I will...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Sánchez Madrid, Nuria
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2015
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/188655
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/188655
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Politeness
Moralization
Decorum
Civilization
Politesse
Civilisation
Culture
Moralisation
Kant
Descripción
Sumario:[EN] This paper tackles the contribution that the beautiful appearance of virtue, whose multiplicity of forms can be gathered under the generic name of decorum, offers to the civilizing process and also to the progressive moralization of mankind according to Kant’s Moral Anthropology. First, I will focus on the homiletic virtues analyzed in the Metaphysics of Morals, that is, loquacity, politeness, hospitality and indulgence, which bring about a trompe l’oeil inside the subject, always prone to selfishness and to the perversion of its practical drives. Secondly, I will analyze the relationship between these “supplements of virtue,” good social manners, and an undeniable anthropological fact, that is, the weakness of human nature and the need to use aesthetic crutches to get accustomed to acting in accordance with pure practical principles. Finally, I will cast light on the importance that parerga deserves according to Kant, who argues that these special virtues must be cultivated in the midst of social life, that is to say, always in contact with others. On the contrary, moral appearance produced by the individual subject ought to be banned unequivocally, because everyone must avoid falling into false illusions about the purity of her or his own intentions.