Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation

This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcom...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Hamoudi, Hamid, Rodríguez Iglesias, Isabel, Sanz Martín-Bustamante, Marcos
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
Repositorio:BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
OAI Identifier:oai:burjcdigital.urjc.es:10115/30865
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10115/30865
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Zoning
spatial competition
welfare function
equilibrium results
industrial policy
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spelling Optimal Zoning in Spatial DifferentiationHamoudi, HamidRodríguez Iglesias, IsabelSanz Martín-Bustamante, MarcosZoningspatial competitionwelfare functionequilibrium resultsindustrial policyThis study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator.Estudios de Economía202420242017info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/10115/30865reponame:BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlosinstname:Universidad Rey Juan CarlosInglésAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:burjcdigital.urjc.es:10115/308652026-06-24T12:48:17Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
spellingShingle Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
Hamoudi, Hamid
Zoning
spatial competition
welfare function
equilibrium results
industrial policy
title_short Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title_full Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title_fullStr Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
title_sort Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Hamoudi, Hamid
Rodríguez Iglesias, Isabel
Sanz Martín-Bustamante, Marcos
author Hamoudi, Hamid
author_facet Hamoudi, Hamid
Rodríguez Iglesias, Isabel
Sanz Martín-Bustamante, Marcos
author_role author
author2 Rodríguez Iglesias, Isabel
Sanz Martín-Bustamante, Marcos
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Zoning
spatial competition
welfare function
equilibrium results
industrial policy
topic Zoning
spatial competition
welfare function
equilibrium results
industrial policy
description This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017
2024
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10115/30865
url https://hdl.handle.net/10115/30865
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 Internacional
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 Internacional
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Estudios de Economía
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Estudios de Economía
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
instname:Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
instname_str Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
reponame_str BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
collection BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,81155

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