Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcom...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
| Repositorio: | BURJC-Digital. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:burjcdigital.urjc.es:10115/30865 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10115/30865 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Zoning spatial competition welfare function equilibrium results industrial policy |
| Sumario: | This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator. |
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