Conciliar Christology and the Problem of Incompatible Predications

In this article I canvas the options available to a proponent of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation against a charge of incoherence. In particular, I consider the charge of incoherence due to incompatible predications both being true of the same one person, the God-man Jesus Christ. For ins...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Pawl, T. (Timothy)|||/items/de493540-5d74-4ad2-8f3d-d6b404319dd5
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2015
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Navarra
Repositorio:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/40227
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10171/40227
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Materias Investigacion::Teología y Ciencias religiosas
Conciliar Christology
Kenotic Christology
Qua-clauses
Incarnation
Incompatible Predicates
Descripción
Sumario:In this article I canvas the options available to a proponent of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation against a charge of incoherence. In particular, I consider the charge of incoherence due to incompatible predications both being true of the same one person, the God-man Jesus Christ. For instance, one might think that anything divine has to have certain attributes – perhaps omnipotence, or impassibility. But, the charge continues, nothing human can be omnipotent or impassible. And so nothing can be divine and human. So Christ is not both God and man, contrary to the traditional doctrine of the incarnation. To do so, first, in Section II, I will present the problem as a deductively valid argument. I then, in that section, go on to show that the proponent of traditional Christology should grant all but one premise of the argument. In the remaining sections I will canvas possible solutions to the problem. In Section III I discuss three ways to deny Premise 3 of the forthcoming argument. These ways include a Kenotic response, qua-modification (in four versions), and finally a response that accepts the compatibility of the allegedly incompatible predicates.