Security threats of satellite navigation receivers
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are the cornerstone of several modern systems: from smartphones to military applications. Therefore, their security is of utmost importance. This Master Thesis performs a security assessment on Septentrio's AsteRx-m3 receiver on two planes: a...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis de maestría |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) |
| Repositorio: | UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/367942 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2117/367942 |
| Access Level: | acceso embargado |
| Palabra clave: | Global Positioning System GNSS GPS Spoofing GNSS Receiver Penetration testing HackRF One Sistema de posicionament global Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Enginyeria de la telecomunicació::Radiocomunicació i exploració electromagnètica::Satèl·lits i ràdioenllaços |
| Sumario: | Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are the cornerstone of several modern systems: from smartphones to military applications. Therefore, their security is of utmost importance. This Master Thesis performs a security assessment on Septentrio's AsteRx-m3 receiver on two planes: a penetration testing engagement with the receiver's interfaces, and a GPS L1 C/A signal spoofing project. The assessment is satisfactory and distinct vulnerabilities are found on the web interface of the receiver, raging from low to high severity. On the GPS signal side, the Software Defined Radio used to carry out the spoofing is the HackRF One and the false GPS L1 C/A signal is generated using the software GPS-SDR-SIM. At first, the receiver detects the HackRF One signal Code-Carrier Divergence and repudiates the signal. After identifying and describing the problem, a fix is correctly implemented and, finally, the AsteRx-m3 receiver is successfully spoofed. |
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