On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semantics

Although possible worlds semantics is a powerful tool to represent the semantic properties of natural language sentences, it has been often argued that it is too coarse: with the tools that pos- sible worlds semantics puts at our disposal, any relevant semantic difference has to be a truth condition...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Martí, Genoveva, Martínez Fernández, José, 1969-
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2019
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/153584
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/153584
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Semàntica (Filosofia)
Veritat
Semantics (Philosophy)
Truth
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spelling On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semanticsMartí, GenovevaMartínez Fernández, José, 1969-Semàntica (Filosofia)VeritatSemantics (Philosophy)TruthAlthough possible worlds semantics is a powerful tool to represent the semantic properties of natural language sentences, it has been often argued that it is too coarse: with the tools that pos- sible worlds semantics puts at our disposal, any relevant semantic difference has to be a truth conditional difference representable as a difference in intension. A case that raises questions about the abil- ity of possible worlds semantics to make the appropriate discrim- inations is the distinction between rigidity and direct reference, an issue deeply connected to the representation of the behaviour of two operators: 'dthat' and 'actually'. Differences between the mode of operation of 'dthat' and 'actually' have been observed, but they have not been examined in depth. Our purpose is to explore systematically to what extent the observed differences be- tween the two operators have truth conditional consequences that are formally representable in possible worlds semantics.Institute of Philosophy Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences2019info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/153584Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26308Organon F, 2019, vol. 26, num. 3, p. 491-504https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26308cc-by-nc (c) Martí, Genoveva et al., 2019http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1535842026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semantics
title On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semantics
spellingShingle On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semantics
Martí, Genoveva
Semàntica (Filosofia)
Veritat
Semantics (Philosophy)
Truth
title_short On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semantics
title_full On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semantics
title_fullStr On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semantics
title_full_unstemmed On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semantics
title_sort On 'Actually' and 'dthat': truth-conditional differences in possible worlds semantics
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Martí, Genoveva
Martínez Fernández, José, 1969-
author Martí, Genoveva
author_facet Martí, Genoveva
Martínez Fernández, José, 1969-
author_role author
author2 Martínez Fernández, José, 1969-
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Semàntica (Filosofia)
Veritat
Semantics (Philosophy)
Truth
topic Semàntica (Filosofia)
Veritat
Semantics (Philosophy)
Truth
description Although possible worlds semantics is a powerful tool to represent the semantic properties of natural language sentences, it has been often argued that it is too coarse: with the tools that pos- sible worlds semantics puts at our disposal, any relevant semantic difference has to be a truth conditional difference representable as a difference in intension. A case that raises questions about the abil- ity of possible worlds semantics to make the appropriate discrim- inations is the distinction between rigidity and direct reference, an issue deeply connected to the representation of the behaviour of two operators: 'dthat' and 'actually'. Differences between the mode of operation of 'dthat' and 'actually' have been observed, but they have not been examined in depth. Our purpose is to explore systematically to what extent the observed differences be- tween the two operators have truth conditional consequences that are formally representable in possible worlds semantics.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/153584
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/153584
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26308
Organon F, 2019, vol. 26, num. 3, p. 491-504
https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26308
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc (c) Martí, Genoveva et al., 2019
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc (c) Martí, Genoveva et al., 2019
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Institute of Philosophy Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Institute of Philosophy Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.301603

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