The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from Changes in Lendable Shares around Corporate Votes
This paper investigates voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Investors restrict lendable supply and/or recall loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incent...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CUNEF Universidad |
| Repositorio: | OpenCUNEF |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/23 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/23 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Proxy Voting Securities Lending Institutional Investors Value of the Vote |
| Sumario: | This paper investigates voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Investors restrict lendable supply and/or recall loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incentives to monitor, for firms with poor performance or weak governance, and for proposals where returns to governance are likely higher. At the subsequent vote, recall is associated with less support for management and more support for shareholder proposals. Our results indicate that institutions value their vote and use the proxy process to affect corporate governance. |
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