Goodbye connections, hello Bagehot: democratization, lender of last resort independence and bank failures in Spain in 1931

Did democratization reduce the likelihood of politically connected bank bailouts in the past? What role did private central banks play as independent lenders of last resort? To answer these questions, this article provides new detailed archival evidence on the causes of bank failures in Spain in Jul...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Jorge-Sotelo, Enrique
Tipo de documento: artigo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Data de publicação:2026
País:España
Recursos:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositório:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/226491
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/226491
Access Level:Acesso embargado
Palavra-chave:Catalunya
República Catalana, 1931
Fallides bancàries
Història econòmica
Espanya
Bancs de liquidació
Catalonia
Catalan Republic, 1931
Bank failures
Economic history
Spain
Clearinghouses (Banking)
Descrição
Resumo:Did democratization reduce the likelihood of politically connected bank bailouts in the past? What role did private central banks play as independent lenders of last resort? To answer these questions, this article provides new detailed archival evidence on the causes of bank failures in Spain in July 1931. We show how, on the back of a safety net provided by close connections to the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–30), bankers embarked in a rapid and outward-oriented expansion characterized by politically driven credit misallocation and risk-shifting on the eve of the Great Depression. Transition to democracy with the coming of the Spanish Second Republic in April 1931 terminated the safety net provided by these connections and the collapse of international trade and finance caused insolvency to surface. Democratic fiscal authorities clashed with the opposition of Banco de España – the privately owned lender of last resort – to share losses stemming from a bailout, resulting in bank failures.