Fantasía y razón en Margaret Cavendish. O acerca del conocimiento de animales, vegetales y minerales
This paper aims to study the notions of fancy and reason in two works by Margaret Cavendish: Philosophicall Fancies (1653) and Philosophical Letters (1664). I argue that, despite one being an early work and the other a mature one, this distinction does not affect her notions of fancy and reason. The...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Murcia |
| Repositorio: | DIGITUM. Depósito Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Murcia |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digitum.um.es:10201/165570 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.537721 http://hdl.handle.net/10201/165570 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Razón Fantasía Conocimiento Animales Vegetales Fancy Reason Knowledge Vegetables Cavendish No relacionado con ningún objetivo de desarrollo sostenible |
| Sumario: | This paper aims to study the notions of fancy and reason in two works by Margaret Cavendish: Philosophicall Fancies (1653) and Philosophical Letters (1664). I argue that, despite one being an early work and the other a mature one, this distinction does not affect her notions of fancy and reason. Therefore, there is continuity on this topic between the early work of 1653 and the mature work of 1664. Likewise, despite some name changes, in Philosophical Letters Cavendish maintains her original position regarding the knowledge of animals, vegetables, and minerals. |
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