Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?

[EN] This study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the numbe...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Sacristán Navarro, María, Cabeza García, Laura, Gómez Ansón, Silvia
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Universidad de León
Repositorio:BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de León
OAI Identifier:oai:dnet:buleria_____::4b3a69a8b752c6ff425fc217c18b4730
Acceso en línea:https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329
https://hdl.handle.net/10612/21035
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Empresas
Family firms
Corporate governance
Multiple large shareholders
Shareholders’ disproportionate board representation
Control-enhancing mechanisms
Socioemotional wealth
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spelling Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?Sacristán Navarro, MaríaCabeza García, LauraGómez Ansón, SilviaEmpresasFamily firmsCorporate governanceMultiple large shareholdersShareholders’ disproportionate board representationControl-enhancing mechanismsSocioemotional wealth[EN] This study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the number of other large shareholders and their relative ownership over the family increase disproportionate family board power in the boardroom. Moreover, when the other large shareholders have more ownership than the family, disproportionate family board representation increases. The findings also highlight the significance of the other large shareholders’ identity. Foreign investors reduce disproportionate family board power, while it does not appear to be affected by families and individuals or institutional investors. In sum, this research confirms the use of disproportionate board power by families as a control-enhancing mechanism to entrench family power on the board and protect their socioemotional wealth.SIThe work was supported by the Ministry of Science and Innovation [PID2019-105140RB-I00] and Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (Spain) [RTI2018-097447-B-100].Taylor & FrancisOrganizacion de EmpresaFacultad de Ciencias Economicas y Empresariales2024info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329https://hdl.handle.net/10612/21035reponame:BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Leóninstname:Universidad de LeónInglésinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/ Programa Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento y Fortalecimiento Científico y Tecnológico del Sistema de I+D+i/ PID2019-105140RB-I00info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:dnet:buleria_____::4b3a69a8b752c6ff425fc217c18b47302026-06-24T12:43:27Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
title Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
spellingShingle Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
Sacristán Navarro, María
Empresas
Family firms
Corporate governance
Multiple large shareholders
Shareholders’ disproportionate board representation
Control-enhancing mechanisms
Socioemotional wealth
title_short Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
title_full Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
title_fullStr Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
title_full_unstemmed Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
title_sort Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Sacristán Navarro, María
Cabeza García, Laura
Gómez Ansón, Silvia
author Sacristán Navarro, María
author_facet Sacristán Navarro, María
Cabeza García, Laura
Gómez Ansón, Silvia
author_role author
author2 Cabeza García, Laura
Gómez Ansón, Silvia
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Organizacion de Empresa
Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Empresariales
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Empresas
Family firms
Corporate governance
Multiple large shareholders
Shareholders’ disproportionate board representation
Control-enhancing mechanisms
Socioemotional wealth
topic Empresas
Family firms
Corporate governance
Multiple large shareholders
Shareholders’ disproportionate board representation
Control-enhancing mechanisms
Socioemotional wealth
description [EN] This study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the number of other large shareholders and their relative ownership over the family increase disproportionate family board power in the boardroom. Moreover, when the other large shareholders have more ownership than the family, disproportionate family board representation increases. The findings also highlight the significance of the other large shareholders’ identity. Foreign investors reduce disproportionate family board power, while it does not appear to be affected by families and individuals or institutional investors. In sum, this research confirms the use of disproportionate board power by families as a control-enhancing mechanism to entrench family power on the board and protect their socioemotional wealth.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329
https://hdl.handle.net/10612/21035
url https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329
https://hdl.handle.net/10612/21035
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/ Programa Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento y Fortalecimiento Científico y Tecnológico del Sistema de I+D+i/ PID2019-105140RB-I00
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor & Francis
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor & Francis
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de León
instname:Universidad de León
instname_str Universidad de León
reponame_str BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de León
collection BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de León
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.811543

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