Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?

[EN] This study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the numbe...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Sacristán Navarro, María, Cabeza García, Laura, Gómez Ansón, Silvia
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Universidad de León
Repositorio:BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de León
OAI Identifier:oai:dnet:buleria_____::4b3a69a8b752c6ff425fc217c18b4730
Acceso en línea:https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329
https://hdl.handle.net/10612/21035
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Empresas
Family firms
Corporate governance
Multiple large shareholders
Shareholders’ disproportionate board representation
Control-enhancing mechanisms
Socioemotional wealth
Descripción
Sumario:[EN] This study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the number of other large shareholders and their relative ownership over the family increase disproportionate family board power in the boardroom. Moreover, when the other large shareholders have more ownership than the family, disproportionate family board representation increases. The findings also highlight the significance of the other large shareholders’ identity. Foreign investors reduce disproportionate family board power, while it does not appear to be affected by families and individuals or institutional investors. In sum, this research confirms the use of disproportionate board power by families as a control-enhancing mechanism to entrench family power on the board and protect their socioemotional wealth.