Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees

Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? Exploiting the Italian system for refugees' reception and data from Italian municipalities, we show that proximity to elections reduces the probability that a municipality applies to host a refugee center by 26%, despite the economic benefits...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Gamalerio, Matteo, Negri, Margherita
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/200815
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/200815
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Migració (Població)
Refugiats
Incentius fiscals
Eleccions
Migration (Population)
Refugees
Tax incentives
Elections
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spelling Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugeesGamalerio, MatteoNegri, MargheritaMigració (Població)RefugiatsIncentius fiscalsEleccionsMigration (Population)RefugeesTax incentivesElectionsDo electoral incentives affect immigration policies? Exploiting the Italian system for refugees' reception and data from Italian municipalities, we show that proximity to elections reduces the probability that a municipality applies to host a refugee center by 26%, despite the economic benefits arising from these centers. Low electoral competition and high shares of extreme-right voters drive the effect. Our results are rationalized by a theoretical model and can explain the unequal distribution of refugees across and within countries.Oxford University Press2023202320232023info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion20 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/200815Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbad002Journal of Economic Geography, 2023, vol. 23, num. 4, p. 901-920https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbad002(c) Gamalerio, Matteo et al., 2023http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/2008152026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees
title Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees
spellingShingle Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees
Gamalerio, Matteo
Migració (Població)
Refugiats
Incentius fiscals
Eleccions
Migration (Population)
Refugees
Tax incentives
Elections
title_short Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees
title_full Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees
title_fullStr Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees
title_full_unstemmed Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees
title_sort Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gamalerio, Matteo
Negri, Margherita
author Gamalerio, Matteo
author_facet Gamalerio, Matteo
Negri, Margherita
author_role author
author2 Negri, Margherita
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Migració (Població)
Refugiats
Incentius fiscals
Eleccions
Migration (Population)
Refugees
Tax incentives
Elections
topic Migració (Població)
Refugiats
Incentius fiscals
Eleccions
Migration (Population)
Refugees
Tax incentives
Elections
description Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? Exploiting the Italian system for refugees' reception and data from Italian municipalities, we show that proximity to elections reduces the probability that a municipality applies to host a refugee center by 26%, despite the economic benefits arising from these centers. Low electoral competition and high shares of extreme-right voters drive the effect. Our results are rationalized by a theoretical model and can explain the unequal distribution of refugees across and within countries.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
2023
2023
2023
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/200815
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/200815
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbad002
Journal of Economic Geography, 2023, vol. 23, num. 4, p. 901-920
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbad002
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Gamalerio, Matteo et al., 2023
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Gamalerio, Matteo et al., 2023
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 20 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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