Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in tax enforcement
Tax auditing parameters have been largely overlooked by the literature as policy-making instruments of any relevance; however, enforcement strategies are critical elements of the tax burden. In this paper, we show that, in a federal framework, tax auditing policies can serve as additional tools for...
| Autores: | , , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/107982 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/107982 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Política fiscal Impostos Reforma fiscal Fiscal policy Taxation Tax reform |
| Sumario: | Tax auditing parameters have been largely overlooked by the literature as policy-making instruments of any relevance; however, enforcement strategies are critical elements of the tax burden. In this paper, we show that, in a federal framework, tax auditing policies can serve as additional tools for regional interaction. We examine the presence of this interaction by adopting a spatial econometric approach. We employ a spatial panel autoregressive model and obtain results that are congruent with standard theory, corroborating the presence of horizontal competition between regions in their tax auditing policies. We also find that once regional governments acquire legal power, the opaque competition in enforcement policies appears to switch in part to a more transparent competition in statutory tax parameters. |
|---|