Empirical Evidence on Cooperation Between Sub-Central Tax Administrations
The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralised cont...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/107313 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/107313 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Política fiscal Impostos Reforma fiscal Assessors fiscals Fiscal policy Taxation Tax reform Tax consultants |
| Sumario: | The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralised context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralised tax administration as, in the medium to long run, the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved. |
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