The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies

Empirical assessments of partisan models of politics have primarily focused on the relationship between government composition and policy outcomes. However, we argue that it is necessary to take parties outside government into account because their preferences also shape policy in parliamentary demo...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Amat, Francesc, Falcó Gimeno, Albert
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2013
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/165083
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/165083
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Negociació
Política
Despesa pública
Descentralització administrativa
Negotiation
Practical politics
Public expenditures
Decentralization in government
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spelling The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democraciesAmat, FrancescFalcó Gimeno, AlbertNegociacióPolíticaDespesa públicaDescentralització administrativaNegotiationPractical politicsPublic expendituresDecentralization in governmentEmpirical assessments of partisan models of politics have primarily focused on the relationship between government composition and policy outcomes. However, we argue that it is necessary to take parties outside government into account because their preferences also shape policy in parliamentary democracies. We show that a measure of parliamentary partisanship based on the preferences and bargaining power shares of all legislative parties outperforms the more traditional measure of government partisanship in explaining policy outcomes. In particular, we find that this is the case for public social spending and political decentralization.Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad2013info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/165083Articles publicats en revistes (Ciència Política, Dret Constitucional i Filosofia del Dret)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.32796/cice.2013.85.6053Cuadernos Económicos del ICE, 2013, vol. 85, p. 81-104https://doi.org/10.32796/cice.2013.85.6053(c) Cuadernos Económicos del ICE , 2013info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1650832026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies
title The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies
spellingShingle The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies
Amat, Francesc
Negociació
Política
Despesa pública
Descentralització administrativa
Negotiation
Practical politics
Public expenditures
Decentralization in government
title_short The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies
title_full The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies
title_fullStr The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies
title_full_unstemmed The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies
title_sort The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Amat, Francesc
Falcó Gimeno, Albert
author Amat, Francesc
author_facet Amat, Francesc
Falcó Gimeno, Albert
author_role author
author2 Falcó Gimeno, Albert
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Negociació
Política
Despesa pública
Descentralització administrativa
Negotiation
Practical politics
Public expenditures
Decentralization in government
topic Negociació
Política
Despesa pública
Descentralització administrativa
Negotiation
Practical politics
Public expenditures
Decentralization in government
description Empirical assessments of partisan models of politics have primarily focused on the relationship between government composition and policy outcomes. However, we argue that it is necessary to take parties outside government into account because their preferences also shape policy in parliamentary democracies. We show that a measure of parliamentary partisanship based on the preferences and bargaining power shares of all legislative parties outperforms the more traditional measure of government partisanship in explaining policy outcomes. In particular, we find that this is the case for public social spending and political decentralization.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/165083
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/165083
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.32796/cice.2013.85.6053
Cuadernos Económicos del ICE, 2013, vol. 85, p. 81-104
https://doi.org/10.32796/cice.2013.85.6053
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Cuadernos Económicos del ICE , 2013
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Cuadernos Económicos del ICE , 2013
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Ciència Política, Dret Constitucional i Filosofia del Dret)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,301603

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