The Arithmetics of partisanship and policy outcomes in parliamentary democracies
Empirical assessments of partisan models of politics have primarily focused on the relationship between government composition and policy outcomes. However, we argue that it is necessary to take parties outside government into account because their preferences also shape policy in parliamentary demo...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/165083 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/165083 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Negociació Política Despesa pública Descentralització administrativa Negotiation Practical politics Public expenditures Decentralization in government |
| Sumario: | Empirical assessments of partisan models of politics have primarily focused on the relationship between government composition and policy outcomes. However, we argue that it is necessary to take parties outside government into account because their preferences also shape policy in parliamentary democracies. We show that a measure of parliamentary partisanship based on the preferences and bargaining power shares of all legislative parties outperforms the more traditional measure of government partisanship in explaining policy outcomes. In particular, we find that this is the case for public social spending and political decentralization. |
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