Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof Pairwise Exchange
We analyze centralized non-monetary markets for indivisible objects through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We characterize a family of do- mains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) such that there exist pairwise exchange rules that satisfy individual rational...
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| Formato: | informe técnico |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/11918 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/11918 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | C71 C78 D71 D78 Pairwise Exchange Individual Rationality Constrained Efficiency Strategy-Proofness Maximal Domain. Teoría de la decisión Teoría de Juegos 1209.04 Teoría y Proceso de decisión 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos |
| Resumo: | We analyze centralized non-monetary markets for indivisible objects through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We characterize a family of do- mains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) such that there exist pairwise exchange rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Minimal reversal domains are maximal rich domains for individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy- proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common rank- ing but for a specific pair of objects. |
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