Bad company. The indirect effect of differences in corporate governance in the pension plan industry
This paper analyses the role played by pension plan governance structure and how it impacts on plan fees and plan performance. The results clearly show that fees decrease significantly and performance improves when pension plan governance structures permit full alignment of interests and allow great...
| Autores: | , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/25856 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2454/25856 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Pension plan governance Bargaining power Fees Performance |
| Resumo: | This paper analyses the role played by pension plan governance structure and how it impacts on plan fees and plan performance. The results clearly show that fees decrease significantly and performance improves when pension plan governance structures permit full alignment of interests and allow greater capacity for the decision-makers to monitor and discipline the managers. It is also observed that companies managing both employee and individual funds, tend to exploit differences in the internal corporate governance mechanisms of each type of plan in order to nurture employer-sponsored plans at the expense of individual plans. These results suggest that internal corporate governance mechanisms allowing closer alignment with the interests of participants would be preferable to focusing exclusively on setting the minimum proportion of independent directors. |
|---|