Activism of pension funds and corporate governance quality

Pension funds are institutional investors of great relevance to capital markets in Brazil and abroad. As their ownership of public companies grows, pension funds tend to intensify their monitoring on the managers of incumbent companies. Using their prerogative as important shareholders, pension fund...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Punsuvo, Fábio Riberi, Kayo, Eduardo Kazuo, Barros, Lucas Ayres Barreira de Campos
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2007
País:Brasil
Institución:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
Repositorio:Revista Contabilidade & Finanças (Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:revistas.usp.br:article/34243
Acceso en línea:https://www.revistas.usp.br/rcf/article/view/34243
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Governança corporativa
Fundos de pensão
Ativismo
Criação de valor
Corporate governance
Pension funds
Activism
Value creation
Descripción
Sumario:Pension funds are institutional investors of great relevance to capital markets in Brazil and abroad. As their ownership of public companies grows, pension funds tend to intensify their monitoring on the managers of incumbent companies. Using their prerogative as important shareholders, pension funds are able to exercise these monitoring activities more actively. Thus, the main objetive of this article is to analyze the relationship between the pension fund's ownership and the quality of corporate governance of the incumbent companies. Results show a negative relation between these variables, suggesting a possible tradeoff between ownership and corporate governance as mechanisms of alignment between pension funds and companies.