A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions

Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions are auctions that allow participants to bid for bundles of goods to buy, for bundles of goods to sell, and for transformations of goods. The intuitive meaning of a bid for a transformation is that the bidder is offering to produce a set of output goods after h...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Giovannucci, Andrea, Cerquides, Jesús, Endriss, Ulle, Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2010
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/139438
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/139438
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Optimization
Supply chain management
Petri nets
Combinatorial auctions
Bidding language
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spelling A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctionsGiovannucci, AndreaCerquides, JesúsEndriss, UlleRodríguez-Aguilar, Juan AntonioOptimizationSupply chain managementPetri netsCombinatorial auctionsBidding languageMixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions are auctions that allow participants to bid for bundles of goods to buy, for bundles of goods to sell, and for transformations of goods. The intuitive meaning of a bid for a transformation is that the bidder is offering to produce a set of output goods after having received a set of input goods. To solve such an auction the auctioneer has to choose a set of bids to accept and decide on a sequence in which to implement the associated transformations. Mixed auctions can potentially be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, mixed auctions can be effectively applied only if we can also ensure their computational feasibility without jeopardising optimality. To this end, we propose a graphical formalism, based on Petri nets, that facilitates the compact represention of both the search space and the solutions associated with the winner determination problem for mixed auctions. This approach allows us to dramatically reduce the number of decision variables required for solving a broad class of mixed auction winner determination problems. An additional major benefit of our graphical formalism is that it provides new ways to formally analyse the structural and behavioural properties of mixed auctions. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.This work was funded by the Jose Castillejo programme (JC2008-00337), IEA (TIN2006-15662-C02-01), OK (IST-4-027253-STP), eREP(EC-FP6-CIT5-28575) and Agreement Technologies (CONSOLIDER CSD2007-0022, INGENIO 2010)Peer ReviewedKluwer Academic PublishersConsejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (España)Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]2016201620102016info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Postprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/139438reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)InglésSíinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/1394382026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
title A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
spellingShingle A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Giovannucci, Andrea
Optimization
Supply chain management
Petri nets
Combinatorial auctions
Bidding language
title_short A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
title_full A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
title_fullStr A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
title_full_unstemmed A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
title_sort A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Giovannucci, Andrea
Cerquides, Jesús
Endriss, Ulle
Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio
author Giovannucci, Andrea
author_facet Giovannucci, Andrea
Cerquides, Jesús
Endriss, Ulle
Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio
author_role author
author2 Cerquides, Jesús
Endriss, Ulle
Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (España)
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Optimization
Supply chain management
Petri nets
Combinatorial auctions
Bidding language
topic Optimization
Supply chain management
Petri nets
Combinatorial auctions
Bidding language
description Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions are auctions that allow participants to bid for bundles of goods to buy, for bundles of goods to sell, and for transformations of goods. The intuitive meaning of a bid for a transformation is that the bidder is offering to produce a set of output goods after having received a set of input goods. To solve such an auction the auctioneer has to choose a set of bids to accept and decide on a sequence in which to implement the associated transformations. Mixed auctions can potentially be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, mixed auctions can be effectively applied only if we can also ensure their computational feasibility without jeopardising optimality. To this end, we propose a graphical formalism, based on Petri nets, that facilitates the compact represention of both the search space and the solutions associated with the winner determination problem for mixed auctions. This approach allows us to dramatically reduce the number of decision variables required for solving a broad class of mixed auction winner determination problems. An additional major benefit of our graphical formalism is that it provides new ways to formally analyse the structural and behavioural properties of mixed auctions. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010
2016
2016
2016
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
Postprint
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/139438
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/139438
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Sí
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Kluwer Academic Publishers
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Kluwer Academic Publishers
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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