Winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions via petri nets

Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) allow agents to bid for bundles of goods to buy, goods to sell, and transformations of goods. In particular, MMUCAs offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents offering goods and services, and in general...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Giovannucci, Andrea, Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan Antonio, Cerquides, Jesús, Endriss, Ulle
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2007
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/162981
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/162981
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Combinatorial auctions
Petri nets
Supply chain formation
Integer programming
Descripción
Sumario:Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) allow agents to bid for bundles of goods to buy, goods to sell, and transformations of goods. In particular, MMUCAs offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents offering goods and services, and in general MMUCAs extend and generalise several types of combinatorial auctions. Here we provide a formalism, based on an extension of Petri Nets, with which MMUCAs, and therefore all auction types subsumed by MMUCAs - - and in particular combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation (SCF) - -, can be formally analysed. As a second direct benefit, consequence of the provided mapping to Petri Nets, we manage to dramatically reduce the number of decision variables involved in the optimisation problem posed by MMUCAs from quadratic to linear for a wide class of MMUCA Winner Determination Problems (WDPs). Hence, we also make headway in the practical application of MMUCAs, and in particular to SCF. © 2007 IFAAMAS.