Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de Janeiro

We evaluate the deterrence effects of the age of criminal responsibility on total drug trafficking and homicide crimes per age, based on a quasi-experiment generated by differences in punishment severity for these crimes prescribed by the Statute of the Child and Adolescent and by the Penal Code in...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Montolio, Daniel, Oliveira, Cristiano
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/220181
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/220181
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Tràfic de drogues
Brasil
Anàlisi de regressió
Incentius laborals
Drug traffic
Brazil
Regression analysis
Incentives in industry
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spelling Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de JaneiroMontolio, DanielOliveira, CristianoTràfic de droguesBrasilAnàlisi de regressióIncentius laboralsDrug trafficBrazilRegression analysisIncentives in industryWe evaluate the deterrence effects of the age of criminal responsibility on total drug trafficking and homicide crimes per age, based on a quasi-experiment generated by differences in punishment severity for these crimes prescribed by the Statute of the Child and Adolescent and by the Penal Code in Brazil. To this end, information from arrests conducted by the civil and military police of Rio de Janeiro in 2016 and 2017 is used to estimate the local effects of treatment through a Regression Discontinuity Design. Instead of using recidivism data and/or grouping crimes with distinct punishment severity, we use as an outcome variable the total number of arrests (crimes) per age for drug trafficking and homicides, which are the most common crimes related to organized crime in Rio de Janeiro. The results indicate that, ceteris paribus, the increase in punishment severity generated by the Penal Code can reduce the number of drug trafficking-related crimes by 9% and homicides by 37%. Through simple cost benefit analysis, we suggest that increasing the punishment severity for minors who commit homicide could reduce juveniles engagement in a criminal career associated with gangs and generate gains in social well-beingSpringer Science + Business Media2025info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/220181Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09478-7Trends In Organized Crime, 2025, vol. 28, p. 100-124https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09478-7(c) Springer Science + Business Media, 2025info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/2201812026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de Janeiro
title Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de Janeiro
spellingShingle Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de Janeiro
Montolio, Daniel
Tràfic de drogues
Brasil
Anàlisi de regressió
Incentius laborals
Drug traffic
Brazil
Regression analysis
Incentives in industry
title_short Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de Janeiro
title_full Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de Janeiro
title_fullStr Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de Janeiro
title_full_unstemmed Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de Janeiro
title_sort Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical evidence from Rio de Janeiro
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Montolio, Daniel
Oliveira, Cristiano
author Montolio, Daniel
author_facet Montolio, Daniel
Oliveira, Cristiano
author_role author
author2 Oliveira, Cristiano
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Tràfic de drogues
Brasil
Anàlisi de regressió
Incentius laborals
Drug traffic
Brazil
Regression analysis
Incentives in industry
topic Tràfic de drogues
Brasil
Anàlisi de regressió
Incentius laborals
Drug traffic
Brazil
Regression analysis
Incentives in industry
description We evaluate the deterrence effects of the age of criminal responsibility on total drug trafficking and homicide crimes per age, based on a quasi-experiment generated by differences in punishment severity for these crimes prescribed by the Statute of the Child and Adolescent and by the Penal Code in Brazil. To this end, information from arrests conducted by the civil and military police of Rio de Janeiro in 2016 and 2017 is used to estimate the local effects of treatment through a Regression Discontinuity Design. Instead of using recidivism data and/or grouping crimes with distinct punishment severity, we use as an outcome variable the total number of arrests (crimes) per age for drug trafficking and homicides, which are the most common crimes related to organized crime in Rio de Janeiro. The results indicate that, ceteris paribus, the increase in punishment severity generated by the Penal Code can reduce the number of drug trafficking-related crimes by 9% and homicides by 37%. Through simple cost benefit analysis, we suggest that increasing the punishment severity for minors who commit homicide could reduce juveniles engagement in a criminal career associated with gangs and generate gains in social well-being
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/220181
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/220181
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09478-7
Trends In Organized Crime, 2025, vol. 28, p. 100-124
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09478-7
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Springer Science + Business Media, 2025
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Springer Science + Business Media, 2025
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Science + Business Media
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Science + Business Media
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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