The dark side of altruistic third-party punishment
This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties in ten different games. The authors show that third-party punishment exhibits several features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto ef...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid |
| Repositorio: | Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/667075 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10486/667075 https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002711408010 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Altruistic punishment Efficiency Inequity-aversion Third parties Economía Sociología |
| Sumario: | This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties in ten different games. The authors show that third-party punishment exhibits several features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto efficient allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Interestingly, this form of punishment is especially pronounced in women and more left-wing participants. Second, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses an equitable allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Finally, third parties considerably punish passive parties who make no choice, especially if the latter are richer than the third party. Implications of these findings for social theory are discussed. |
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