Aristotle’s necessity and coincidences: An interpretation of Metaphysics VI 3 and XI 8
This article presents an interpretation of two disputed passages from Metaphysics VI 3 and XI 8 i n w hich Aristotle’s reasoning is aimed at avoiding universal necessity based on the existence of coincidences. This reasoning has given rise to multiple and incompatible interpretations from Antiquity...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | Colombia |
| Institución: | Universidad EAFIT |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio EAFIT |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/30992 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10784/30992 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Accidents causality coincidences determinism predetermination necessity Accidentes causalidad coincidencias determinismo predeterminación necesidad |
| Sumario: | This article presents an interpretation of two disputed passages from Metaphysics VI 3 and XI 8 i n w hich Aristotle’s reasoning is aimed at avoiding universal necessity based on the existence of coincidences. This reasoning has given rise to multiple and incompatible interpretations from Antiquity to present day. In them, the Stagirite reasoning has been presented in a range that goes from understanding it as a position compatible with the strongest determinism, to one that requires a very general indeterminism. In dialog with these interpretations, a reading will be defended, according to which these assages are designed to argue not against causal determinism but against predetermination. |
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