Offensive realism, differentiation theory, and the war in Ukraine
In this article, I shall demonstrate that several of the arguments made in favour of an offensive realist explanation of Russian actions in Ukraine as part of a power balancing process are inconsistent both with available empirical knowledge of the conflict in Ukraine and with the structural logic p...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | Colombia |
| Institución: | Universidad del Rosario |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22170 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0150-4 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22170 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Civil society Empirical analysis Political conflict Political power Political theory War Russian federation Ukraine Conflict Differentiation theory Offensive realism Russia World society |
| Sumario: | In this article, I shall demonstrate that several of the arguments made in favour of an offensive realist explanation of Russian actions in Ukraine as part of a power balancing process are inconsistent both with available empirical knowledge of the conflict in Ukraine and with the structural logic postulated by offensive realist theory itself. Rather than a conflict about power in a material sense, I will argue that the war in Ukraine is better understood as a conflict about the incompatibility of the Russian state structure to cope with the imperatives of functional differentiation as understood by theories of world society. © 2018, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., part of Springer Nature. |
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