Normativity without dualism: connecting the dots between natural and social sciences
The normative phenomenon is ubiquitous in human interactions, emerging in a wide range of fields studied by social science and considered as one of the essential traits of human’s way of life. The modern subjectivist tradition of social science has been based on a model in which elements like self,...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL) |
| Repositorio: | Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.ufpel:article/11704 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/11704 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Normativity Naturalism Social Science Second Nature Is-Ought. |
| Sumario: | The normative phenomenon is ubiquitous in human interactions, emerging in a wide range of fields studied by social science and considered as one of the essential traits of human’s way of life. The modern subjectivist tradition of social science has been based on a model in which elements like self, freedom and reason play the most relevant roles in explaining normativity by connecting beliefs to behaviors by means of motives that are non-reducible to preferences, desires or impulses. In this paper I will discuss normativity in general in order to turn into normativity as it is conceived in social science and then with a focus on normativity based on reasons. I will argue in favor of a naturalistic approach to normativity by means of a defense of a concept of will, which can provide a bridge between social and natural science, rather than giving further reason to sustain a dualistic approach to them. Moreover, I will claim that mental qualities usually alleged to be essential for assigning personality, agency, and moral responsibility, such as rationality, self-consciousness, and freedom, are neither sufficient nor necessary for a naturalistic characterization of moral agents, or for explaining normativity in human evaluative practices. |
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