Animal normativity
Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two defationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is b...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | Argentina |
| Institución: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repositorio: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119676 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119676 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | ANIMAL MINDS OUGHT-THOUGHTS PRIMITIVE NORMATIVITY SECONDARY REPRESENTATIONS https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
| Sumario: | Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two defationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on Hannah Ginsborg's notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures may have frst-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity. |
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