Corruption, bureaucracy and other institutional failures: the “cancer” of innovation and development
This study analyzes the impact of corruption on the elasticity of R&D investments in sales per worker by firms. In this sense, it built a model of Schumpeterian growth using optimal control theory relating the effects of corruption on demand for R&D. The model results show that corruption ne...
| Autores: | , , , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.ufc.br:riufc/61627 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/61627 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Pesquisa e desenvolvimento Empresas - Corrupção Burocracia Corruption Bureaucracy |
| Sumario: | This study analyzes the impact of corruption on the elasticity of R&D investments in sales per worker by firms. In this sense, it built a model of Schumpeterian growth using optimal control theory relating the effects of corruption on demand for R&D. The model results show that corruption negatively affects the R&D demand and long-term rate of technical progress. However, this cost attributes different 'weights' as firms approach the technological frontier. To empirically test this relationship, it was built partial order- frontiers on a sample of 2,000 firms from 40 sectors and 46 countries. Interacting efficiency scores with the corruption index, the less-efficient firms are disadvantaged with corruption in relation to the frontier firms. This pattern is observed in the coefficient of elasticity of R&D investments indicating that corruption leads to different costs, 'favoring' the most efficient firms in relation to the most backward firms. |
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