ETHICS AND THE SCEPTICAL CHALLENGE: A PRAGMATICIST APPROACH
The aim of the paper is to present the specific reasons why a Peircian or pragmaticist approach is best “equipped” not so much as compared with other pragmatist attempts, but as such, to answer some of the hardest challenges posed by contemporary scepticism, even when it comes to the ethical aspects...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
| Repositorio: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/12235 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/12235 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Desafio cético James Justificação epistêmica Justificativa ética Peirce Pragmaticismo Pragmatismo Putnam Racionalidade normativa. Epistemic justification Ethical justification Normative rationality Pragmaticism Pragmatism Sceptical challenge |
| Sumario: | The aim of the paper is to present the specific reasons why a Peircian or pragmaticist approach is best “equipped” not so much as compared with other pragmatist attempts, but as such, to answer some of the hardest challenges posed by contemporary scepticism, even when it comes to the ethical aspects posed by such a challenge. After sketchingthe major aspects of the sceptical challenge and the most common contemporary answers it gave rise to, an analysis is made of the reasons why the ethical aspect of the challenge is specifically acute, and why, then, in many ways, a pragmaticist approach is not fundamentally different from other pragmatist approaches (in particular Peirce’s and James’); although finally, some arguments are presented in favour of a more straightforwardly Peircian or pragmaticist attitude as being the most efficient parry to the sceptical challenge, along the following lines: 1) a better account of the distinction to be made between ethical and epistemic justification, 2) a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms of doubt, belief, self-control, reasoning and of the emergence and rationality of norms; 3) a more complete account of the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the sceptical challenge which, for a pragmatist, should not be disconnected from the ethical aspects. |
|---|