The esthetic face of Peirce’s pragmaticistic epistemology
Esthetics, as one of Peirce’s normative philosophies, does not have Beauty as its object, but the Admirable, as scholars of his work know. However, this distinction is not immediately apparent, since Admirability also carries within it the predicate of Beauty. What, then, would be the relationship b...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/38456 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/38456 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Peirce Epistemology Pragmaticism Esthetics Ethics Epistemología Pragmaticismo Estética Ética Epistemologia Etica |
| Sumario: | Esthetics, as one of Peirce’s normative philosophies, does not have Beauty as its object, but the Admirable, as scholars of his work know. However, this distinction is not immediately apparent, since Admirability also carries within it the predicate of Beauty. What, then, would be the relationship between both these concepts? Why should the admirable qualify as an end in itself of Esthetics, and constitute the ultimate end of Ethics? What is the nature of esthetic experience, and how can it aid the identification of the Admirable? Based on the insistence that there is a net of concepts in Peirce’s philosophy, from Phenomenology to his Metaphysics, which provide a rich vocabulary to reflect on these issues, this essay seeks to show that there is in the very epistemological nature of pragmaticism an ethicity that, while necessary, is insufficient, demanding that Esthetics provide the ends of the actions that constitute the revelation of concepts, in light of the Peircean categories regarded as structural for the relations between internal and external worlds, under a radically realist viewpoint. |
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