THE SEMANTIC SCEPTICISM EXPOSED BY KRIPKE BASED ON WITTGENSTEIN: an ontological problem?
In Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Kripke reads into Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations a new type of sceptical problem: semantic scepticism. His exposition formulates a sceptical paradox whose objective is to question whether there are facts constitutive of meaning. Starti...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Pólemos (Brasília) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/53950 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/53950 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Ceticismo semântico. Significado. Ontologia. Factualismo. Quadição. Semantic scepticism. Meaning. Ontology. Factualism. Quus. |
| Sumario: | In Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Kripke reads into Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations a new type of sceptical problem: semantic scepticism. His exposition formulates a sceptical paradox whose objective is to question whether there are facts constitutive of meaning. Starting from an arithmetic example, Kripke questions whether, in apparently simple sums, we would actually be following the rule of addition, and not another rule. To show that we are actually carrying out addition, Kripke argues that we must indicate the existence of some fact that justifies us in using ‘+’ meaning addition. The problem is that, as Kripke concludes, no facts satisfy the required conditions. We cannot find such a fact simply because there are no facts constitutive of meaning. Thus, considering the conditions that the putative fact must satisfy, this article intends to defend the interpretative thesis that the problem exposed by Kripke consists, above all, of an ontological problem. |
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