Aristotle’s Sea Battle, Excluded Middle and Bivalence
In this paper, I present a formal reconstruction of the classical argument for fatalism set forth by Aristotle in On Interpretation 9. From there, I expose two different formal solutions for avoiding the unwanted conclusion based on the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s rejection of the Prin...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
| Repositorio: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/96708 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/96708 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Fatalism Future contingents Bivalence Three-valued logic Supervaluationism |
| Sumario: | In this paper, I present a formal reconstruction of the classical argument for fatalism set forth by Aristotle in On Interpretation 9. From there, I expose two different formal solutions for avoiding the unwanted conclusion based on the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s rejection of the Principle of Bivalence: On the one hand, Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic and, on the other hand, supervaluation semantics. I also address some criticisms made against these two proposals. To finish, I remark on some alternative interpretations of Aristotle’s intentions maintaining that the Stagirite philosopher rejected fatalism without abandoning the Principle of Bivalence. |
|---|