| Summary: | La remisión del problema relativo al como de la captación de pensamientos a la psicología por parte de Frege ha llevado a que se imponga entre los críticos la idea de que toda consideración subjetiva está ausente en este autor. La crítica fregueana al psicologismo, sin embargo, se concentra en una crítica a la concepción psicologista de subjetividad y, correlativamente, implica una concepción de subjetividad novedosa en el contexto de la filosofía alemana de la segunda mitad del s. XIX que, como la husserliana, es no-naturalística e intencional. Abstract:Frege regards the problem of how a thought is grasped as belonging to psychology, and this has made the idea that all subjective considerations are absent from his work a dominant trend amongst the critics. The fregean criticism of psychologism, however, focusses on a criticism of the psychologistic conception of subjectivity and, accordingly, implies a conception of subjectivity that is new in the context of the German philosophy of the second half of the 19th century and that is, like Husserl's, non-naturalistic and intentional.Keywords: Frege, psychologism, subjectivity
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