Revisiting the hart-dworkin debate: a critique to interpretative positivisms
With this paper, we intend to launch a critique to current variations of legal positivism. To this matter, we consider useful, even today, to trace the trajectory of the Hart-Dworkin debate as a kind of backbone of Dworkin’s theory of valid law, presented in the form of a general attack to legal pos...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Faculdade Meridional (IMED) |
| Repositorio: | Revista Brasileira de Direito |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.imed1.tempsite.ws:article/2451 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://seer.atitus.edu.br/index.php/revistadedireito/article/view/2451 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Dworkin; Interpretative positivisms; Hermeneutics Ciências Sociais Aplicadas; Direito Dworkin; Positivismos interpretativos; Hermenêutica |
| Sumario: | With this paper, we intend to launch a critique to current variations of legal positivism. To this matter, we consider useful, even today, to trace the trajectory of the Hart-Dworkin debate as a kind of backbone of Dworkin’s theory of valid law, presented in the form of a general attack to legal positivism. Then, we briefly discuss Dworkin’s theory and how it guides the controversy that follows today. At the end, we propose a reflection over the interpretative path left to positivisms. |
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