The answer of Joseph Raz to the Semantic Sting
The paper acesses Joseph Raz’s repley to Ronald Dworkin’s argument known as “semantic sting”. In order to do so, it explains Dworkin’s objection to positivism, arguing that the semantic sting is a development of Dworkin’s original critique published on the famous Model of Rules (section 1). Then, Ra...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
| Repositorio: | Publicum |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br:article/28156 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/publicum/article/view/28156 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Ferrão Semântico Ronald Dworkin Joseph Raz Semantic Sting |
| Sumario: | The paper acesses Joseph Raz’s repley to Ronald Dworkin’s argument known as “semantic sting”. In order to do so, it explains Dworkin’s objection to positivism, arguing that the semantic sting is a development of Dworkin’s original critique published on the famous Model of Rules (section 1). Then, Raz’s reply is described and critically analyzed (section 2). I conclude that his reaction is unsatisfactory to disable Dworkin’s argument. In the end, I consider different alternatives that a positivist can pursue to refute the Dworkinian objection (conclusion). |
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