The expansion of the concept of intentionality: flow intentionality (stromintentionalität) in Husserl's Phenomenology
In this article I will discuss what led Husserl to expand his first model of intentionality, the apprehension-content of apprehension model (act intentionality model), initially exposed in Logical Investigations. I aim to show that the concept of flow intentionality (Stromintentionalität) extends th...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositorio: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/259047 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/259047 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | apreensão consciência fluxo intencionalidade apprehension consciousness flow intentionality |
| Sumario: | In this article I will discuss what led Husserl to expand his first model of intentionality, the apprehension-content of apprehension model (act intentionality model), initially exposed in Logical Investigations. I aim to show that the concept of flow intentionality (Stromintentionalität) extends the very concept of intentionality, initially understood only as the intentionality of an act. I will also show that this expansion of the concept of intentionality implies a change in the phenomenological description of consciousness, from a static analysis to a genetic analysis of consciousness. Therewith, I intend to contribute to the discussion made by Husserl’s interpreters regarding the abandonment of the apprehension-content model of constitution. The position I hold is that Husserl abandons such an intentional model only to describe the deeper layers of the intentional constitution, but he still uses a corresponding act intentionality model to describe the superficial layers of the intentional constitution (operated by acts such as remembering and expectation). |
|---|