Intentionality and consciousness by Searle
The objective of this article is to present a critical analysis about the relation between intentionality and consciousness in John Searle. According to this author, these phenomena are closely related to each other, but the concepts of intentionality and consciousness are not equivalent and neither...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/12550 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/12550 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Searle Intencionalidade Consciência Inconsciente Pano de fundo Estatuto ontológico Intentionality Consciousness Unconsciousness Background Ontological status |
| Sumario: | The objective of this article is to present a critical analysis about the relation between intentionality and consciousness in John Searle. According to this author, these phenomena are closely related to each other, but the concepts of intentionality and consciousness are not equivalent and neither of them comprises the other completely, for the preposition “of” in expressions with intentionality does not mean the same as the preposition “of” in expressions with consciousness. However, by means of a deeper analysis of Searle’s theory of mind, especially about the ontological status of the content of unconscious states, it is possible to see that the separation between intentionality and consciousness defended by Searle is questionable. |
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