AUTONOMY, FREEDOM, AND MORALITY IN KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
This article exposes the centrality of the notion of freedom in the relation between categorical imperative and autonomy of will in Kant’s practical philosophy. After the introduction, which presents the problem of the primacy among formulations of the categorical imperative (canonical formulation a...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Pólemos (Brasília) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/22713 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/22713 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Imperativo. Autonomia. Liberdade. Fundamentação. Imperative. Autonomy. Freedom. Groundwork. |
| Sumario: | This article exposes the centrality of the notion of freedom in the relation between categorical imperative and autonomy of will in Kant’s practical philosophy. After the introduction, which presents the problem of the primacy among formulations of the categorical imperative (canonical formulation and formulation of the autonomy), the article is divided in two parts. In the first part, I examined the relation between categorical imperative and autonomy through the discussion on the interpretations of Bernard Carnois and Henry Allison, subsequently refusing the proposal of a ‘no moral autonomy’. In the second part, I exposed the problems of that relation in Groundwork III, centering my analysis on the concept of positive freedom and the derived difficulties of the notion of deduction. |
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