Discretion and Judicial Decision: Between Hart and Dworkin
This work intends to analyze the theory of Hart and Dworkin regarding primarily to the following items: rules, recognition rules, principles and judicial discretion. We will make an attempt to validate the dworkian interpretation, as opposed to the hartian, as the best form of considering and applyi...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI) |
| Repositorio: | Teorias do Direito e Realismo Jurídico |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.indexlaw.org:article/363 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/teoriasdireito/article/view/363 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Hart Dworkin Regras de reconhecimento |
| Sumario: | This work intends to analyze the theory of Hart and Dworkin regarding primarily to the following items: rules, recognition rules, principles and judicial discretion. We will make an attempt to validate the dworkian interpretation, as opposed to the hartian, as the best form of considering and applying the law. And the best way of implementing the law is one that excludes or limits the cases of discretion in the court decision. The principles indicated by Dworkin allow it, as well as explicit capacity they provide a justification for the law. |
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