The limits of the concept of law: reflections on Kantian legal positivism in relation to Kelsen’s and Hart’s positivism:
In this paper I argue that the model of legal positivism supported by Kant's philosophy of law is able to justify the establishment of limits to the concept of validity of law in a way that Kelsen's and Hart's positivism cannot. This limitation allows to distinguish between barbaric s...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
| Repositorio: | Ethic@ - Revista Internacional de Filosofia da Moral |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/91877 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/91877 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Direito Positivismo jurídico Kant Kelsen Hart Law Legal positivism |
| Sumario: | In this paper I argue that the model of legal positivism supported by Kant's philosophy of law is able to justify the establishment of limits to the concept of validity of law in a way that Kelsen's and Hart's positivism cannot. This limitation allows to distinguish between barbaric states, in which there is no law, and despotic states, which despite not being just states, there is still law. Based on this distinction, one can argue for a positivist theory of law that establishes non-moral normative criteria for the validity of a legal system. In this sense, it is argued that the positivist models of Kelsen and Hart are inferior from the standpoint of their ability to capture legal normativity. |
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